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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOSEPH E. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

-vCLYDE L. MILLER, as Secretary of State
of the State of Utah,

Case No.
12258

Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for an extraordinary writ,
which has been filed in the Utah Supreme Court
by the plaintiff, in which the Supreme Court of theState of Utah has original jurisdiction under Section
78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This ·case has
heretofore been briefed by the parties hereto, and
has heretofore been argued before the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah. However, the time permitted for briefing the case was shorti and the
court, after hearing arguments, ordered that supplemental briefs be filed. The court also therein ordered Judge Nelson's name placed on the ballot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
and has reserved the issues as to constitutionality
of the statute in question (Section 49-7-1.1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Judge Joseph E. Nelson, the plaintiff in this case,
is presently a duly elected and acting Judge of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah
and has been such for several years. Judge Nelson's
present term expires on December 31, 1970, and if
Judge Nelson were to continue into another term,
it would be necessary for him to either be reelected
by the electorate of the State of Utah, or for him to
be reappointed to that position by the Governor of
the State of Utah after that position becomes vacant.
Pursuant to the election statutes of the State
of Utah, the defendant herein, filed a declaration ol
candidacy for the office of Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Utah. That declaration
of candidacy was filed on the 26th day of June, 1970,
and the statutory filing fee was tendered to the Sec·
retary of State at that time. However, because of
Judge Nelson's age (73), the Secretary of State re·
fused to accept the filing fee and returned Judge
Nelson's declaration of candidacy to him at that
time. It has been stipulated by the parties that Judge
Nelson meets the requirements to file for reelection
unless his age prevents him from being eligible to
run for reelection to his present office because of the
provisions of Section 49-7-1.1, supra.
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In 1968, the electorate of the State of Utah, by
avote of 314,819 for and 72,652 against, approved
an amendment to the Utah Constitution which was
added as Section 28 of Art. VIII, and reads as follows:
"The legislature may provide uniform
standards for manditory retirement and for
removal of judges from office. Legislation implementing this section shall be applicable
only· to conduct occurring subsequent to the
effective date of such legislation. Any det-ermination requiring the retirement or removal
of a judge from office shall be subject to review, as to both law and facts, by the supreme
court. This section is additional to and acmulative with the methods of removal of
justices and judges provided in sections 11 and
27 of this Article."

That amendment was carried as Proposition No.
5 on the ballot, and the title of the bill which was
presented to the public and which appeared on the
ballot given to the voters on election day read as
follows:
"A JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING
TO AMEND ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE BY THE ADDITION OF SECTION 28, AUTHORIZING
THE LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE FOR
THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT AND
FOR REMOVAL OF JUDGES FROM OFFICE."
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As implementing legislation, the 1969 legislature passed Section 49-7-Ll, Utah Code Annotated
which was intended to implement that constitutional
amendment, and reads as follows:
"A trial judge shall retire upon attaining
the age of 70 years, and a supreme court judge
shall retire upon attaining the age of 72 years;
provided, however, any judge serving a term as
judge on the effective date of this act who has
attained. the age of retirement, or attains that
age during his present term shall retire on the
completion of his present term."

Judge Nelson is now challenging the constitutionality of that statute, and its constitutionality is
the primary issue before the Court at this time.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE PARTIES
Judge Nelson has asked the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah to issue an extraordinary writ directing the Secretary of State to place his name upon '
the ballots as a candidate, in the Counties of Utah,
Wasatch, Duchesne, Uintah, Summit and Daggett,
for election to the office of Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court. Judge Nelson prays in the alternative that the defendant be ordered to issue to him
a Certificate of Election to the office of Judge of the
Fourth Judicial District Court.
The defendant's answer filed herein asks that
the plaintiff's petition be dismissed and that all statutes alleged to be unconstitutional be upheld as
being constitutional.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ANY LEGISLATION PROPERLY PASSED BY THE
LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO MEET ALL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THE BURDEN
OF SHOWING THAT ANY LEGISLATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTS WITH THE PARTY CHALLENGING THAT LEGISLATION.

With the passage of every piece of legislation
there is a presumption that the new enactment is
constitutional, and the burden of showing any unconstitutionality rests with the party seeking its destrucion. This principal has been reitterated by the
Utah Supreme Court on many occasions. In the case
of Rio Grande Lumber Company v. Dorke, 50 Utah 114,
167 Pac. 241, the Court, at pp. 119-120, stated it as
follows:
"[A/fter fully and fairly considering the
powers of the legislative body and the limitations of its power under the Constitution, if
there is a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court, that doubt must be cast in favor of the
validity of the act .... Mr. Justice Washingington, of the Supreme Court of the United
States, upon this point, uses the following
language:
'But if I could rest my opinion in favor
of the constitutionality of the law on which
the question arises, on no other ground than
this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone
would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory
vindication of it. It is but a decent respect due
to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism
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of the legislative body by which any law is
passed to presume in favor of its validity until
its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. That has always
been the language of this court when that subject has called for its decision.'

**

*

**

Any other rule than this would be inconsistent
and untenable from every point of view, and
would be a reflection upon the wisdom and
motives, and an interference with the prerogatives, of an independent co-ordinate department. These rules are fundamental and elementary."

This same principal has been stated by the Utah
Supreme Court in Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98
Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937, and Tintic Standard Mining Co. v.
Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 663, inter alia.
In addition to the existence of a strong presump·
tion of constitutionality, the courts unanimously
place a heavy burden of proof on the party alleging
unconstitutionality, and the Utah Supreme Court
has required that unconstitutionality be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of Gubler v. Utah
Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188 192 P.2d 580,
2 A.L.R. 2d 1022, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"If there is reasonable doubt about the
validity or invalidity of this act, then the duty
of this court is to resolve the doubt in favor
of constitutionality." (Emphasis added)
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In that same case, at 113 Utah 200, the Court
quoted with approval, from Section 39, Black's Handbook of Constitutional Law, the following statements:
"Every presumption is in favor of the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature ...
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the statute, not against it; and the
courts will not adjudge it invalid unless the
violation of the constitution is, in their judgment, clear, complete, and unmistakable."

In State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah
406, 164 Pac. 285, the court said:
"(I)f the court entertains a reasonable
doubt upon the question, then the law must be
upheld."

This same principal has also been stated in Norville

I'. State Tax Commission, supra, Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Dorke, supra, and Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 Pac.

367.

In this case, it seems clear and unec;uivocal that
there is much more than a reasonable doubt about
the unconstitutionality of the statute in question, and
the burden to show the unconstitutionality beyond a
reasonable doubt has not been met here.
Therefore, in view of the very strong presumption of constitutionality of all legislative enactments, and in view of the very strong pronouncements by this court that any reasonable doubt about
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the validity or invalidity of a statute rrcust l::G Ts
solved in favor of constitutionality, it is respectfully
submitted that the statute in question in this case
should be clearly upheld.
POINT II
WHEN A STATUTE HAS TWO POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTIONS AND ONE OF THOSE CONSTRUCTIONS
WOULD VALIDATE THE STATUTE WHILE THE
OTHER CONSTRUCTION WOULD RENDER IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT MUST ADOPT THE
CONSTRUCTION WHICH WOULD VALIDATE THE
STATUTE.

One of plaintiff's contentions is that the implementing legislation contained in Section 49-7-1.1
exceeds the authority granted to the legislature in
Article 8, Section 28. It is claimed that mandatory
retirement must be based upon some "conduct"
of the judge for whom mandatory retirement is provided.
Such a claim is contrary to the accepted meaning of the word retirement as now commonly used
by our society. Retirement is most frequently based
upon age and/ or disability. Retirement does not
require any affirmative action or conduct, but merely requires the termination of employment or the
termination of office upon the retirees reaching the
usual set age of retirement.
Conduct is seldom a basis of retirement, and
the language included later in the amendment as
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to conduct was clearly placed there, modifying the
portion of the amendment providing for the removal
of judges for cause and was not intended to apply
to the portion of that section relating to mandatory
retirement. In addition, it was to protect the judiciary
from attempts being made to remove a judge from
office for some past conduct on his part, which conduct had not been grounds for removal at the time
the acts of conduct were performed. That phrase, if
it relates to retirement, could reasonably be construed to require the legislature to allow judges then
serving elected terms upon the effective date of the
legislation to continue to serve for the term for
which they had already been elected prior to the
enactment of mandatory retirement legislation, even
though the judge may already have reached the
mandatory retirement age, and such a provision
was included by the legislature in enacting Section
49-7-1.1.
Other courts have discussed the distinctions
between the words retirement, removal and discharge.
In Geary v. Phillips, 278 N.Y.S.2d 506, 53 Misc. 2d 337,
the New York Supreme Court held that "retirement
does not constitute removal," and in Jacobs v. New
Jersey State Highway Authority, 54 N.J. 393, 255 A.2d 266,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said:
"Retirement from employment has a connotation different from discharge. The former
ordinarily significes voluntary withdrawal, the
latter compulsory dismissal."
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In the case of Morrison v. Department of Highways,
229 La. 116, 85 So. 2d 51, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana said that the words removal and retirement "are not synonymous," although they did not
elaborate on the distinctions.
As is shown above, the statute in question, Section 49-7-1.1, and the constitutional amendment under which that statute was passed, are capable of
two different types of construction. One construction would be as is argued by plaintiff, that the
word "conduct" in the constitutional amendment
applies to the standards for mandatory retirement
as well as to the standards for removal of judges
from office. The other possible construction would
be that the word "conduct" only applies to the provisions as to removal of judges, because the terrns
"mandatory retirement" are commonly thought of
not to require any conduct, as idefendant's contention in this case. Therefore, since there are two
possible constructions of the constituttional and
statutory language, one of which would validate the
statute while the other would render the statute
unconstitutional, it is repecfully urged that the court
should adopt the interpretation which would validate the statute in conformance to the rule recited
by this Court in many instances.
In the case of Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 39 P.2d
1061, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"In our discussion of the various objections urged against the constitutionality of the
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amendment . . . , it is necessary to keep in
mind certain elementary rules of statutory construction among which are: That when the
validity of a statute assailed upon construtional
grounds and there are two possible constructions by one of which the statute would be rendered unconstitutional and the other valid,
the court should adopt the later construction."

In the case of Norville, v. State Tax Commission, supra,
the Utah Supreme Court again held:
"When there is ambiguity in the terms of
a statute or when it is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it unconstitutional and the other bring it within
constitutional sanctions, the court is bound to
choose that interpretation which would uphold
the statute, and to produce a statute unconstitional only when the case is so clear as to be
free from doubt. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co. v. Strickley, (28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, 1
L.R.A., N.S., 976, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711, 3
Ann. Cas. 1110 affirmed in 200 U.S. 527, 26
S.Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174)
Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272;
Denver & Rio Grande v. Grand County, 51
Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224; Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 1257,
32 L. Ed. 253; 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 92 at p. 719
et seq."

This same principle has also been cited in Tintic
Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, supra. This principle
has also been very well stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2d,
Constitutional Law, Sec. 145, wherein it states:
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"It is an elementary principle that where
the validity of a statute is assailed and there
are two possible interpretations, by one of
which the statute would be unconstitutional
and by the other it would be valid, the court
should adopt the construction which will uphold it, even though the construction which is
adopted does not appear to be as natural as
the other."

Although the plaintiff may argue that his construction of the constitutional language seems more
natural and would fit in better, according to the
above statement from Am. Jur. 2d, the court should
still validate the statute where there are two possible interpretations of it, "even though the consruction which is adopted does not appear to be as
natural as the other."
In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that the statute in question and the constitutional amendment are capable of two types of con·
struction, and the court should clearly rule that the
statute is constitutional and harmonious with the '
constitutional requirements.
POINT III
WHEN THE VOTERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH ,
APPROVED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT,
THEY BELIEVED THAT IT WAS A PROVISION TO
MANDATORILY RETIRE JUDGES FROM OFFICE
UPON THE ATTAINMENT OF A GIVEN AGE, AND
THE COURT, IF POSSIBLE, SHOULD INTERPRET IT
TO MEAN WHAT IT MEANT TO THE VOTERS.
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As was mentioned earlier, the title of Proposition No. 5 as it appeared on the ballot, and the title
of the bill which was always presented to the public
and which the voters saw as they voted for and approved the proposition read as follows:
"A JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING
TO AMEND ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY
THE ADDITION OF SEC. 28, AUTHORIZING THE LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE
FOR THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT
AND FOR THE REMOVAL OF JUDGES
FROM OFFICE."

Thus, as the voters entered the voting booth to decide this issue, the above statement was what they
read, and the wording which they had before them
at the time they voted in favor of the proposition.
This title to the proposition clearly sets forth that
the voters believed they were voting for a provision
which would authorize the legislature to provide
for the mandatory retirement of judges as well as
for the removal of judges from office. Under the
current understanding of today's society of these
terms, the public would have believed they were
voting for the mandatory retirement of judges upon
the reaching of some age to be determined by the
legislature, and for judges to be removed from office for certain conduct which would constitute
cause for removal.
The above stated principle has been clearly
approved by the Utah Supreme Court before in the
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case of Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, supra,
in which the Utah Supreme Court accepted a definition because it was commonly accepted and well
established, and they stated:
"We are restricted to this definition because of another canon of constitution construction that terms used in a constitution
must be taken to mean what they meant to the
minds of the voters of the state when the provision was adopted." (Emphasis added)

Involuntary retirement based on age exists
throughout American culture today, in both the public and private sector. Persons associate retirement
with age. Retirement for conduct is not common in
our society and would not have been considered
by a voter deciding how to vote on this proposed ,
amendment.
POINT IV
THE CLASSIFICATION MADE BY THE LEGISLA·
TURE IN SECTION 49-7-1.1 IS NOT UNREASONABLE
OR ARBITRARY AND THERE IS A REASONABLE
BASIS FOR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CLASSES.

Plaintiff also claims that the provision of Section 49-7-1.1, setting forth a different retirement age
for a trial judge than a supreme court judge violates
the requirement of the constitutional amendment
which states that the legislature may provide "unifonn standards for mandatory retirement."
It was undoubtedly contemplated by the draft·
ers of the constitutional langauge that maximum
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protection should be given to an individual judge
so that some standards could not be enacted
singling out any judge for special treatment allowing him to remain in office or to require his retirement, and was also meant to comply with already
well established constitutional law concepts of
equal protection.
In the case of Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement
System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44 246 P.2d
591, the Supreme Court of Utah, in considering a retirement act dealing with other state employees,
dealt with very similar issues. The court therein
made the following statements which set forth
proper legal concepts applicable here: 1
"Some such inequities are practically inevitable in all retirement systems, especially in
the first years of their operation."

"It was therefore essential that some
classification be made."
"As to discrimination: an act is never
unconstitutional because of discrimination so
long as there is some reasonable basis for differentiation between classes which is related
to the purposes to be accomplished by the act."

The constitution and laws of the State of Utah have
always recognized that a reasonable classification
1See

also:

State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523,
116 P.2d 766; State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d
920, 117 A.L.R. 330; and Gronlund v. Salt Lake
City, 113 ,Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464.
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exists for differentiation between supreme court
judges and district court judges. Article 8, Section
2 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provides:
" . . . every judge of the Supreme Court
shall be at least 30 years of age."

While Article 8, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
" .. each judge of a district court shall
be at least 25 years of age."

It is evident and certainly needs no elaboration
to the honorable justices of the this court that the
nature of the work of a district court judge is not
identical to the work performed by a supreme court
justice. This is particularly true of many districts in
Utah where a district court judge is required to
cover a large geographical area and his work involves travel over that area. Driving over large
areas requires a certain amount of physical strength
and physical stamina which older persons frequently do not have, and this significant difference in
physical activity from that required of a supreme
court justice is in itself sufficient to form a reasonable basis for the classification included within the
act providing for a mandatory retirement age for
district court judges of two years younger than that
required for supreme court judges.
An important difference also exists in the ability of the Supreme Court to conduct business by a
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quorum. It is a well-known fact that older persons
tend to be ill more than younger persons, and if a
district court judge becomes ill and unable to work,
his district may become totally void of any acting
judiciary; whereas, if a Supreme Court Justice becomes ill and unable to work, it will increase the
workload of his associates, but it will not cripple
the court and prevent it from acting. Also, the Supreme Court could obtain assistance from District
Court Judges to distribute the workload.
Petitioner also alleges that the right to hold elective office is a privilege and depriving a person of
that right by reason of age alone is an unreasonable
deprivation of that privilege, and violative of
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution.
However, the right to hold elective office is no more
of a privilege than is the right to be gainfully employed, and if mandatory retirement by reason of
age alone is unconstitutional, then every retirement rule in the country is placed in serious
jeopardy.
Petitioner also further alleges that a maximum
age limitation is a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution, but the
cases are numerous which have held that as long as
the distinction is based on a reasonable classification as is above stated, it is not a denial of equal
protection, and it is suggested that a limitation
which applies equally to all similar judicial offices
;snot a denial of equal protection.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully suggested to this Honorable
Court that the legislation which was properly
passed by the legislature is in full accord with the
intent which the voters had at the time they approved that constitutional amendment, and there
is a reasonable construction out of two possible constructions, one of which would validate the statute.
In view of the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes, and the other factors mentioned in this
brief, it is respectfully suggested to the Court that
the classifications made in that statute are reasonable and that the statute is in compliance with all
constitutional requirements.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General

VERL R. TOPHAM
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the Defendant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

